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THE TOPOGRAPHY OF DIVINE LOVE:
A RESPONSE TO JEFF JORDAN
Thomas Talbott

Jeff Jordan has recently challenged the idea, widely accepted among theistic
philosophers, that “God’s love must be maximally extended and equally intense.” By way of a response, I suggest a way to sidestep Jordan’s argument
entirely and then try to show that his own argument is multiply flawed. I thus
conclude that his challenge is unsuccessful.

In an article that recently appeared in this journal,1 Jeff Jordan explores the
topography of divine love, as he calls it, and does so in an effort to challenge a proposition that he acknowledges to be widely accepted among
theistic philosophers, namely:
(L) If God exists and is perfect, then God’s love must be maximally extended
and equally intense. (53)

If (L) is true, as I and many other non-Calvinists believe it is, then any
theology that would restrict God’s love to a limited elect is clearly mistaken. So anyone who believes that God freely confers his saving grace
on some even as he freely withholds the same degree of grace from others
will no doubt have a strong incentive to reject (L) and thus to agree with
Jordan in this matter. In fairness, I should perhaps point out that nowhere
in the paper we are currently considering does Jordan explicitly endorse a
doctrine of limited election. But he does say this: “If the divine love cannot
be maximally extended and equally intense, it may not be surprising, or
perhaps as surprising, that God saves a particular sinner but not another
who is no less a sinner” (68). Such a statement may seem milder than Calvin’s statement: “For as Jacob, deserving nothing by good works, is taken
into grace, Esau, as yet undefiled by any crime, is hated.”2 But Jordan’s
statement, no less than Calvin’s, seems to endorse the idea that God loves
some people a lot more than he does others.
Such a view carries a heavy theological price. For consider another
proposition that Jordan also challenges:
1
See Jeff Jordan, “The Topography of Divine Love,” Faith and Philosophy 29 (2012), 53–69.
All future page references in the text will be to this article.
2
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1960), 946.
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(P) If God exists, then the relation between creator and human is that of loving parent and child.

If we have a “strong reason to deny (L),” Jordan points out, “we also have
strong reason to deny (P). And with (P) false, the good parent analogy
fails” (68). So it is likely, according to Jordan, that a morally perfect God
does not love (or will the very best for) all created persons in the same way
that good parents love (or will the very best for) all of their own children.
But if that is true, then the following scenario is also possible: Even though
good parents desire the very best for all of their own children, God himself
does not likewise desire (or will) the best for all of these very same children. And that, I should think, would be too heavy a price for any loving
parent to pay.
So why does Jordan nonetheless believe that we have a strong reason
to deny (L)? His argument for this conclusion rests upon the following
principle:
(TD) For all properties F, if F is a deficiency when had by a human, then F
cannot be a great-making property when had by God. (58)

And though he makes no claim to have established the truth of (TD), he
does claim, after discussing some alleged counterexamples, that we have
a good reason to think it true. Accordingly, after endorsing this principle,
he applies it to the property described in the consequent of (L), namely,
the property having a kind of love that is maximally extended to all people and
equally intense for each of them (call it having maximally extended love for
short). He then argues as follows: The property having maximally extended
love would constitute a deficiency in any human being who managed to
exemplify it; therefore, it should not to be numbered among a perfect
God’s great-making properties; therefore, we have good reason to believe
that (L) is false.
It seems to me, however, that such an argument is as deeply flawed
as it is important, and I shall divide what follows into four sections. In
section (i) I shall suggest that one can sidestep Jordan’s entire argument
against (L) by focusing on a property that a human could have, but God
could not have, without loving all created persons equally. In section (ii)
I shall begin to examine Jordan’s own argument against (L) and argue
that he needs to close the logical gap between two very different claims:
the claim that an absence of deep attachments in a human life would be
a deficiency and the claim that maximally extended love, if someone
should somehow manage to achieve it, would likewise be a deficiency.
Then, in sections (iii) and (iv), I shall challenge Jordan’s contention that
“if God has deep attachments, it follows that God does not love [all humans] equally” (67). And, finally, in section (iv) I shall also try to explain
why, in my opinion, there can be no real conflicts of interest in a theistic
universe, why there can be no exclusiveness and no partiality in love over
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the long term, and why, as the New Testament states repeatedly, God is
no respecter of persons.
I
Consider a property that one exemplifies only when one’s love extends
maximally and with equal intensity to every person that one freely
chooses to bring into being, whether it be through procreation or outright
creation. It is hard to see why such a property, call it having maximally
extended parental love (or PL), would constitute a deficiency when exemplified by a human; it is equally hard to see how a Creator that failed to
exemplify PL would nonetheless qualify as a morally perfect being. For
even as human parents have an obligation, sometimes met and sometimes
not met, to love (or will the best for) each of the children whom they freely
choose to bring into this earthly life, so a morally perfect God would, of
necessity, love (or will the best for) each of those persons whom he freely
chooses to create. And even as a child’s disobedience in no way abrogates
a parents’ obligation to act in the child’s best interest, neither would our
human sinfulness abrogate a morally perfect God’s responsibility to act in
our best interest as well.
Now given the assumption that no contingently existing person comes
into being unless God freely chooses to bring that person into being, the
important point about PL is just this: Whereas we humans can exemplify it without loving all people equally, our Creator could not likewise
exemplify it without loving all created persons equally. So if having PL
would be a moral virtue and in no way a human deficiency, as I presume
even Jordan would acknowledge, then a proponent of (L) need not reject
Jordan’s claim that the property having maximally extended love would constitute a relevant deficiency in any human who exemplifies it. For even
if that were true, which I seriously doubt, a proponent of (L) could still
argue as follows:
(1) Necessarily, if God exemplifies PL, then his love is maximally extended and equally intense.
(2) Necessarily, if God exists and is morally perfect, then God exemplifies PL.
Therefore, necessarily
(L) If God exists and is morally perfect, then his love is maximally extended and equally intense.
Given Jordan’s own defense of (TD), moreover, the question of whether
having maximally extended love is a divine perfection or a great-making
property has no relevance at all to the above argument for (L). For the
centerpiece of Jordan’s defense of (TD) is his claim that the property of
being great-making is not closed under entailment. By way of an illustration, he points out that being omniscient entails having at least five beliefs.
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But whereas being omniscient is a divine perfection, he claims, having at
least five beliefs is not. He thus writes: “The moral to draw here is that
having a certain property may be a necessary condition of having another
property and it may well be that the latter property is great-making. But
even so, it does not follow that the former property is great-making”
(60). Does this not give away the proverbial farm, however? If, as Jordan
insists, great-making properties are not closed under entailment, then
proponents of (L) have no need to claim that having maximally extended
love is itself a great-making property; they need claim only that the property being morally perfect is great making, that God’s moral perfection
entails PL, and that he exemplifies PL only if he also exemplifies having
maximally extended love. It is enough, in other words, for proponents of
(L) to insist that, whether or not having maximally extended love is itself
properly classified as a great-making property, God cannot be morally
perfect unless he also exemplifies this property. And for that reason alone,
(TD) seems utterly irrelevant to the question of whether (L) is indeed a
sound principle.
Many Christians have also believed that reasons for attributing PL to
God are implicit in the New Testament teaching about God’s relationship
to the entire human race. They are implicit, for example, in St. Paul’s assertion to a pagan audience that we are all, both pagans and Christians alike,
the very offspring of God (see Acts 17:28–29); they are also implicit in his
further assertion that there is “one God and father of all, who is above all
and through all and in all” (Eph. 4:6—my italics).3 And similarly for the
following comment: “For this reason I bow my knees before the Father,
from whom every family in heaven and on earth takes its name” (Eph.
3:14–15). Christians sometimes suggest that, as the Creator of all humans,
God is not the Father of them all in the same sense that he is the Father
of all believers, and a similar thought may explain Jordan’s own remark
concerning the Lord’s Prayer. In response to William Rowe, who in my
opinion rightly cites the Lord’s Prayer as evidence of the Christian understanding of God’s universal Fatherhood, Jordan writes: “Rowe seems
not to have noticed that the context of the invocation, ‘Our Father which
art in heaven,’ is instructing disciples (rather than persons generally) on
prayer” (68n35). It simply does not follow, however, that non-disciples,
non-Christians, or even atheists have no right to address God in the same
way. An atheist may not recognize God’s fatherhood and may have little
or no inclination, therefore, to address God as Father, but that is another
matter altogether.
Here it is important, I believe, to avoid a possible misunderstanding
of the parent/child relationship. In no way does the right kind of parental
love for a child—or, for that matter, God’s love for an unbeliever—require
3
Unless otherwise indicated, all Bible quotations in this essay are from the New Revised
Standard Version copyrighted in 1989 by the National Council of Churches of Christ in the
United States of America.
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a context of full reconciliation. Good parents do not disown a disobedient
child, and neither do they love a rebellious teenager any less than they do a
more cooperative one. Full reconciliation between good parents and their
wayward children, like full reconciliation between God and his wayward
children, no doubt requires a context of repentance and forgiveness. But
as the parable of the prodigal son illustrates so forcefully, bad (or even
monstrous) behavior on the part of a son or a daughter will in no way diminish a good parent’s love for that rebellious son or daughter. I have seen
no more poignant illustration of this truth than a television interview, just
prior to Ted Bundy’s execution in 1989, with his long-suffering mother.
When the interviewer asked this dear woman—a committed Christian, by
the way—whether she could continue to support a son who had become
a monster (as a serial murderer of young women), her response was most
telling. She began to shake uncontrollably, her eyes filled with tears, and
she could barely be heard to whisper these words: “Of course I support
him; he is my son; I love him; I have to support him.” She did not, of
course, support his monstrous crimes or even object to the severity of his
punishment. But she still loved him as a mother loves a son, still yearned
for his redemption, and was still prepared to do everything within her
power to promote his best interest. Such love as she possessed was obviously a source of terrible suffering for her—comparable, perhaps, to the
psychological anguish that, according to the New Testament accounts,
Jesus experienced on the Cross. But it nonetheless remains the deepest
conceivable kind of love for another.
II
Let us now begin to examine more closely Jordan’s own argument against
(L), and towards that end let us also accept, at least for the sake of argument, his crucial principle:
(TD) For all properties F, if F is a deficiency when had by a human, then F
cannot be a great-making property when had by God. (58)

Just how, first of all, should we understand the idea of a deficiency in the
context of this principle? Jordan directs our attention to an extremely important (albeit easily misinterpreted) point when he writes: “Much of the
richness of life [my emphasis] flows from one’s friendships and one’s spouse
and one’s children, and within these attachments there is a love which is
neither impartial nor equally shared by all other persons, as one loves
her beloved more than she does others” whom she may not even know
(60–61). Within the same context, he also speaks positively of the role that
deep attachments play “in making life worth living” and speaks negatively of how “a lack of the deep attachments . . . is clearly a defective life.”
Similar comments in the same context concern conditions under which a
human “would have a life significantly impoverished” and under which
“one’s life would be diminished.” These descriptions suggest that we
should interpret his expression “F is a deficiency when had by a human”
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as being roughly equivalent to something like: “F would somehow detract
from the richness of life and from what we find to be most valuable, important, or significant in an earthly life were some human to exemplify it.”
All of which suggests the following argument: A human life without
deep attachments would clearly be impoverished and in that sense deficient; given (TD), therefore, the property having a life without deep attachments could not be one of God’s perfections or great-making properties.
That argument, however, seems almost trivial, and I cannot imagine any
Christian who endorses (L) wanting to challenge it. Those of us who endorse (L) should also concede, I believe, the following two-fold claim:
first, that our deepest attachments to family and friends contribute greatly
to the richness of our lives, and second, that we in fact love (in the sense
of being deeply attached to) those within our own circle of intimacy more
than we do those outside this circle.
But where does the argument go from there? How do we get from the
premise that the absence of deep attachments in a human life would be
a deficiency to the conclusion that maximally extended love, if someone
should somehow manage to achieve it, would likewise be a deficiency? It
is certainly no mystery, after all, why our deep attachments to family and
friends typically coincide, as a practical matter, with the absence of similar
attachments to strangers we do not even know. For given our normal
human limitations and the normal conditions of an earthly life, we are
simply in no position to form deep attachments with everyone, including
those not yet born or those who lived and died in the distant past. We no
more have the capacity to form deep attachments with literally everyone,
in other words, than we have to believe all true propositions or to be omniscient. But it no more follows that maximally extended love in a human
would qualify as a deficiency than it follows that omniscience in a human
would likewise qualify as a deficiency.
Still, if we can set aside any pretense of precision and at least imagine
ourselves possessing any one of the divine perfections, it might seem as
if any one of them would detract from what we find to be most valuable, important, or significant in our earthly lives as they actually unfold.
Take omniscience, for example. If we had come into this earthly life omniscient (I make no comment here on the possibility of such a thing), this
would have eliminated, for starters, any possibility of a quest for truth
and any opportunity to make meaningful discoveries about the nature
of our extravagant universe and our place within it. It would even have
eliminated, I presume, much of what Jordan finds most important in our
deepest attachments, such as our acquiring over time an ever deepening
knowledge of a loved one’s unique personality and an ever greater appreciation of it. Similarly, if we had come into this earthly life with a fully
mature and utterly intense love for everyone (again I make no comment
on the possibility of such a thing), we would have no lessons of love to
learn, no need for repentance, forgiveness, and atonement, and no reason
to make hard moral choices. Mind you, I make no claim, based on such
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considerations, that we should regard either omniscience or maximally
extended love as a deficiency when had by a human;4 neither do I claim
that these considerations suffice to refute (TD).5 For our purposes, it is
enough simply let the chips fall where they may with respect to these
issues. I do claim, however, that we have no better reason to believe that
maximally extended love would undermine the richness or the purpose
of an earthly life than we have to believe that omniscience would do the
same thing.
Not that we should evaluate all of the divine perfections in exactly
the same way. With respect to God’s omnipotence, it is no doubt metaphysically impossible that any being distinct from God should likewise
be omnipotent. But we might think of maximally extended love, by way
of contrast, as an ideal that, even though we lack the capacity to satisfy
it under the conditions of a normal earthly life, we should nonetheless
try to approximate as much as we can, particularly with respect to those
people we do know. We might call such an unattainable ideal, then, an
Earthly Life Impracticality, a condition that obtains whenever the circumstances of our earthly lives prevent us from achieving some desirable goal
or satisfying some worthwhile ideal. Unlike logical impossibilities, many
such Earthly Life Impracticalities are contextually dependent; that is, they
depend upon circumstances that obtain at a given time, and these can
change with the passage of time, especially if we should take into account
future ages and other realms of existence.
Illustrations of the point seem readily available. Whereas being sexually intimate with someone might undermine completely the innocence
and richness of a normal childhood, it might also enrich the life of an
adult; and whereas a stunning beatific vision, one that renders certain
moral choices utterly impossible, might seem to undermine the very purpose of an earthly life, given a common Christian understanding of the
importance of human freedom, it might nonetheless enrich the lives of
the redeemed in heaven. In a similar manner, the institution of marriage,
which no doubt enriches the earthly lives of many, might turn out to be
4
For as Tom Flint pointed out in a comment on an earlier version of this paper, a person
might very well argue as follows: “There is, to be sure, value in our questing for truth, but
. . . more value in our possessing it, and being in the latter condition would not necessarily
undermine the richness or purpose of earthly human life. Similarly, though repentance and
forgiveness are valuable, a life without the need for repentance or forgiveness is not necessarily diminished (e.g., Christ’s life wasn’t diminished, and Adam’s wouldn’t have been had
he obeyed).”
5
For as an anonymous referee wrote: “Might it not be that having the divine perfections
is what makes for divinity? In short, if [a human subject] S couldn’t have the divine perfections and remain human, then having them couldn’t be a deficiency when had by a human.
The moral of the story is that there seems to be a need for criteria that delimit what can
reasonably qualify as a property F in (TD) such that the antecedent of (TD) could be true and
the consequent false.” Although the first part of this quotation may seem inconsistent with
certain understandings of the Incarnation, I tend agree with the final sentence. See also my
own remarks on contextual dependence below.

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF DIVINE LOVE

309

utterly inappropriate, as Jesus himself pointed out, in the radically different circumstances of a future age. In the Gospel accounts, Jesus thus remarked: “Those who belong to this age marry and are given in marriage;
but in that age those who are considered worthy of a place in that age
and in the resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage.” Why not? Because “they are like angels and are children of God,
being children of the resurrection” (Lk. 20:34–36). The suggestion here
seems to be that partiality in our present love relationships, such as may
exist in a good marriage, is only temporarily appropriate as a concession
to the conditions of an earthly life.
In fact, if the purpose of an earthly life has anything to do with soulmaking, as John Hick famously called it, then an opportunity for moral development and spiritual growth is surely an essential part of that purpose.
For we all emerge with a first person perspective in a context of ambiguity,
ignorance, and misperception, and it is within such a context that we be
gin to make choices, begin to experience the consequences of these choices
and to learn important lessons from them, and, according to the Christian
faith, begin to develop with God’s help the kind of loving character that he
intends to bring to fruition in a coming age or in another realm.
I would also point out, finally, that our normal human limitations typically detract from the quality of our deepest attachments. For just as we
humans have no capacity during our earthly lives to achieve an equal
intimacy with all created persons, neither do we have a capacity to know
the heart of even our closest loved ones as intimately as God does. It is
nonetheless through our most intimate and special love relationships, I
would argue, that God teaches us the true nature—that is, reveals to us the
full intimacy and intensity—of his own love for each one of us. For given
that we humans have only a limited number with whom we can achieve
genuine intimacy during the short period of a normal lifetime on earth,
how else could we learn to appreciate the full intensity of God’s love for
each of us except by analogy with our own most intimate and special love
relationships? And why, if he regarded the Father’s love as limited and
partial as ours, would Jesus have commanded that we love not only our
neighbors and closest friends, but even our enemies as well? We are to do
this, he declared, so that we too might “be perfect” even as our “heavenly
Father is perfect” (see Mt. 5:43–48). Such a love may lie well beyond our
power to achieve, particularly at the beginning of our earthly lives. But it
nonetheless is a perfection of God, Jesus declared, and, as already indicated, an ideal that we should therefore strive to realize in our own lives as
much as we can. Striving to realize such an ideal would entail, I presume,
never cutting off overtures to friendship arbitrarily, steadily expanding
over time and where practically possible our own circle of intimacy, and
always being prepared to act like a good Samaritan in our relation to
strangers in need.
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III
The question that has emerged so far concerns how Jordan proposes to
close the logical gap between a proposition that virtually all Christians
would accept, namely:
(3) A human life without deep attachments would be seriously deficient,
and a proposition that many Christians would reject, namely:
(4) The life of a human who somehow managed to exemplify having
maximally extended love (either in this age or in some other) would be
seriously deficient.
We can perhaps illustrate the problem inherent in trying to close this
logical gap in the following way. Let LC be a property that one exemplifies
only if one’s love extends maximally and with equal intensity to every
living Christian. The same considerations that lead Jordan to claim that “a
human who loved all other humans equally and impartially would have
a life significantly impoverished” (60) might lead another to claim that a
human who loved all Christians “equally and impartially (and who thus
exemplified LC) would have a life significantly impoverished.” For according to Jordan, “a person appropriately loves his own children more
than other children. And without the inequality of love, one’s life would
be diminished” (61). Here Jordan means to include, I presume, my appropriately loving my own children more than I do the Christian child of
some African peasant. So if some human, such as Jesus or a perfected saint
in heaven, should manage to exemplify LC and should therefore manage
to love all Christian children with an equal intensity, would that entail a
human deficiency? It is hard to see why it should. A lesser love, or even no
love at all, for some unknown child on a far-away continent contributes
nothing, so far as I can tell, to the deepest possible love of parents for
their own children. To the contrary, insofar as they love their own children as intensely as they should, they no doubt also manifest a disposition,
despite their many human limitations, to will the best for all other children
as well.
Even within the context of our limitations as finite beings, moreover,
every addition to our circle of intimacy over time tends to enrich our lives
further, and rarely does it diminish the intensity of our love for others
within that circle. A woman’s intense love for her husband (and the appropriate exclusiveness in her sexual relations with him) need not diminish
the intensity of her love for the other men in her life, such as her father,
her brother, her son, a close male friend, or even, as in the case of Mary
Magdalene, Jesus himself. Similarly, as any good parent knows, being
deeply attached to one child need not detract from being equally attached
to another, and neither would a supremely perfect God’s deep attachment
to one created person prevent an equally deep attachment to all other
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created persons as well. For God has none of the human limitations that
make it impossible for us to achieve an equally intimate relationship with
all created persons during our earthly lives.
Anticipating a similar objection, Jordan expresses it in the following
way:
The idea here would be that humans have only so much love to go around,
or perhaps better, humans can manifest their love only in limited ways. But
God faces no limitation, and without limitation God’s loving in a maximally
wide and flat way would imply no defect. So, the incompatibility of love and
flatness is a practical matter afflicting humans, which need not extend to an
infinite being. With infinite resources available, does it follow that flatness is
implied by infinity? Or to approach the matter another way, if God is morally perfect and has infinite resources at hand, must flatness follow? (65–66)

When Jordan speaks of flatness here, it is important to appreciate exactly what he does, and does not, have in mind. With respect to loving
parents who love all of their children with an equally great intensity, we
would not ordinarily employ the term “flatness” to describe such love.
But when Jordan speaks of flatness in the context of divine love, he precisely has in mind a conception of love that includes “not just equality
but maximal intensity—[he has in mind, that is, a conception according
to which] every human is loved by God to the same significant degree”
(53). So Jordan’s question in the above quotation is essentially this: If God
is morally perfect and has infinite resources at hand, does it follow that
he loves all of the humans who in fact exist with maximal intensity? And
even though Jordan answers this question negatively, he would not deny,
I presume, that there are possible worlds containing humans in which God
loves all humans with maximal intensity. But with respect to all of the
humans who in fact exist, it is simply not possible, he evidently wants to
argue, that God should both have deep attachments with some of them and
love them all equally. He thus writes: “if God has deep attachments, it follows that God does not love equally” (67). And this follows, he evidently
believes, on account of the conflicts of interest that in fact arise between
humans beings. In his own words: “If God were to love certain humans,
and thereby identify with their interests, then God could not identify with
incompatible interests. In other words, even God cannot love or befriend
every human in the deepest way” (63).
My own view, by way of contrast, is that no real conflicts of interest can
exist in a theistic universe, and I shall try to defend this view further in the
following section. As I see it, indeed, God is so intimately connected with
each of us that he literally experiences our physical environment through
our bodies; he therefore knows each of us from the inside out far more
intimately than even our own parents and spouses do. It is not that God
loves some people less than we manage to love in our deepest attachments;
it is instead that he loves all people far more than this, especially when
our own deepest attachments retain a kind of grasping possessiveness. A
mother who clings to her children in possessive ways as they grow and
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mature does not love them more than God does; she loves them far less
than God does.
In any event, we must now ask: Which of these two contrasting views,
Jordan’s view or my own, seems to be the more defensible? If the threestep argument formulated in section (i) above is sound, then we already
have a good reason to reject Jordan’s view. But in the following section
we must also examine more closely his contention that “if God has deep
attachments, it follows that God does not love equally.”
IV
As Jordan would no doubt be among the first to point out, the following
argument is not, by any stretch of the imagination, formally valid:
(5) Not even God can identify with incompatible interests,
(6) Therefore, “God cannot love or befriend every human in the deepest way.”
So here are two additional premises that in conjunction with (5) would
enable one to construct a valid argument for (6):
(5a) For any person S, God loves S “in the deepest way” possible only
if God identifies with S’s own interests;
(5b) There exist at least two persons, S and S*, such that S and S* have
incompatible interests.
Now, taken individually, each of these additional premises may seem
initially plausible, even noncontroversial. But taken together, they in fact
conceal a crucial ambiguity with respect to what is to count as a person’s
interest. Consider Jordan’s own understanding of a person’s interest “as
[merely] a desire or goal had by that person—something that a person
cares about” (62, note 26). Given that understanding, it is quite obvious
that people have incompatible interests and quite obvious, therefore, that
(5b) is true. But it is equally obvious that (5a) is false. For unless one rejects the idea that God’s perfecting love plays a corrective role in our lives
and rejects the clear assertion in Hebrews 12:6 that God “disciplines those
whom he loves and chastises every child whom he accepts,” it should be
utterly obvious that a God who loves us would not identify with, or “take
as his own,” all of our present desires, aims, and ambitions. Here I am reminded of my own children squabbling in the back seat of a car when they
were young. Although their desires on such an occasion had clearly come
into conflict, my equal love for both of them carried no implication that I
identified with either set of conflicting desires; and even when I resolved
the squabble more to the liking of one child than to that of the other, this
carried no implication that I loved the one child more than I did the other.
Similarly, for the very reason that he does love us, God does not identify
with all of our present desires, aims, and ambitions.
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At the very least, then, we must distinguish between a person’s perceived interests, on the one hand, and a person’s real (or best) interest, on
the other. For whereas we often make mistakes about our real (or best)
interest, merely believing that something is in our interest will suffice to
make it a perceived interest. Accordingly, with respect to our perceived
interests, it is clear that these often do come into conflict and just as clear
that God’s love may oppose them on particular occasions. But with respect
to a person’s best interest, it is by no means obvious that the best interest
of one person could ever conflict with that of another. Neither a Platonist
nor a Christian, for example, would hold that an unjust action, even when
aimed at promoting some perceived interest, would in fact promote one’s
best interest. According to Jordan, however, “it is far from obvious that
God could befriend or love all persons even if he takes as his own only the
best interests of persons” (64). He thus adopts the surprising position that
even someone’s best interest might come into conflict with that of another.
He writes:
It is plausible that never suffering solely for the benefit of another is among
the best interests of persons. But suppose God were to allow some to suffer
in order to achieve a greater good which could not otherwise be achieved.
And suppose further that the suffering, while beneficial to some, is not beneficial to the sufferer. Clearly enough, God could not both identify with the
best interests of every person and yet allow some to suffer that way. . . . If a
great good is obtainable only at the cost of allowing suffering which is not
in the interest of the sufferer, God may yet be justified in allowing that suffering. (63)

So just what might qualify as a “great good” that would justify (or outweigh) God’s acting contrary to someone’s best interest? Unfortunately,
Jordan provides no example of such a great good and not even a hint
of what it might be; neither does he explain how one person’s suffering
could benefit another without at least indirectly benefitting the sufferer
as well. Augustine, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards held that the torments
of those writhing in hell would bring great joy to the saints in heaven.
So is this the kind of example that Jordan has in mind? Alternatively, I
can imagine someone claiming that the suffering of Jesus on the Cross
benefitted others without benefitting himself. But the author of Hebrews
explicitly rejected such an idea in favor of the following three-fold claim:
first, that it was “for the sake of the joy that was set before him” that Jesus
“endured the cross” (Heb. 12:2); second, that the source of this joy was
that his tasting “death for everyone” enabled him to become “the pioneer
[or captain] of their salvation” and thus to bring “many children to glory”
(Heb. 2:9–10); and, finally, that even Jesus himself was in some way made
“perfect through [these] sufferings” (vs. 10). Behind this three-fold claim
lies a remarkable understanding, found throughout the New Testament,
of how love (or willing the very best for another) ties people’s real interests
together and thus makes it impossible for one person’s best interest to
conflict with that of another.
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As an illustration of this New Testament understanding, consider
first St. Paul’s rather offhanded remark concerning his friend and fellow
worker Epaphroditus: “He was indeed so ill that he nearly died. But God
had mercy upon him, and not only on him but on me also, so that I would
not have one sorrow after another” (Phil. 2:27). Given Paul’s love for his
friend, any good that befell his friend would also be a good that befell
Paul and any evil that befell his friend would likewise be an evil that befell Paul. Or, as Jesus put it in his parable of the sheep and the goats: “as
you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me” (Mt.
25:40—RSV). That is why Jesus’ redemptive sufferings, as the New Testament understands them, could not benefit others without also benefitting himself. Similarly, if some unspecified “great good is obtainable only
at the cost of allowing” me to suffer, this good will presumably benefit
someone; and if it benefits some person S whom, in obedience to Christ, I
manage to love even as I love myself, then it will also benefit me. And the
reverse is true as well: Insofar as my suffering harms me and, in obedience
to Christ, S loves me even as S loves S, then my suffering would harm S
even as it harms me.6 In that way, it is the very nature of love (as opposed
to that grasping possessiveness so easily confused with love) that it actually creates a common set of real interests,7 and this is but one reason, I shall
now argue, why there can be no exclusiveness in love over the long run.
Even Paul’s love for Epaphroditus, by the way, would have degenerated into mere selfishness had he permitted his own desire for continued
fellowship in the present to supersede God’s judgment concerning what
might be best for both Paul and Epaphroditus over the long run. So even if
6
As Tom Flint reminded me, some proponents of a freewill theodicy of hell have argued
as follows: If “A would in fact be saved only in response to the horrid example given by B’s
damnation,” then A’s real interest would indeed conflict with that of B. (For an example of
such a view, see William Lane Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 [1989], 172–178.)
Setting aside the controversy over middle knowledge, my own reply to such an argument
consists essentially of the point just made in the paragraph containing the present note. I also
believe that St. Paul in effect rejected such an argument when he wrote: “I have great sorrow
and unceasing anguish in my heart. For I could wish [or pray] that I myself were accursed
and cut off from Christ for the sake of my own people, my kindred according to the flesh”
(Rom. 9:2–3). Nor is there anything irrational, contrary to what some have suggested, in such
a wish or prayer—or at least so I would argue. For given Paul’s love for his kindred, their
ultimate damnation would be no less a source of unceasing anguish in his heart than his
own damnation would be. I develop a more extensive reply to Craig’s view in “Craig on the
Possibility of Eternal Damnation,” Religious Studies 26 (1990). See also John Kronen and Eric
Reitan, God’s Final Victory: A Comparative Philosophical Case for Universalism (New York: The
Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2011), 80–89.
7
Nor can one block this move by appealing, as Jordan does (see his note 29), to the claim
that, if every instance of suffering benefits the sufferer, then we have no incentive to reduce
the total amount of suffering in the world. Although this claim, often associated with H. J.
McCloskey’s widely anthologized article “God and Evil” (first published in The Philosophical
Quarterly 10 [1960]), rests upon a confusion in my opinion, we can let that pass. For I am not
here claiming that every instance of suffering benefits the sufferer. I am claiming instead that
insofar as my suffering promotes the best interest of my loved ones, it promotes my own best
interest as well. And insofar as my suffering is inconsistent with my own best interest, it is
also inconsistent with the best interest of those who love me.
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Epaphroditus had died, this too might have been in accord with a common
set of real interests (as opposed to a common set of perceived interests).
But in any case, the way in which love creates a common set of real interests also helps to explain why genuine love—that is, willing the very best
for another—cannot remain fixated forever on a select few, such as one’s
own children, to the exclusion of others. Suppose that, as might happen in
a bad Hollywood movie plot, a woman’s possessive attitudes with respect
to her only son should induce her to hatch a murderous plot against his
fiancée whom she fears has stolen his heart. It is simply obvious, surely,
that this woman’s murderous jealousy would be just as incompatible with
any genuine love for her son as it would be with any genuine love for his
fiancée. For if her son genuinely cares for his fiancée and thus wills the
very best for her, then the common set of real interests thereby created carries the following implication: Anyone, including the man’s own mother,
who wills less than the best for his fiancée likewise wills less than the best
for the man himself. More generally, for any two persons S and S*, if S
wills the best for S*, then no one (including God) can will less than the best
for S* without also willing less than the best for S.
So here is why there can be no partiality and no exclusiveness in love
over the long run. As our own loved ones—our children, for example—
acquire additional loved ones of their own; and as these in turn acquire
still more loved ones, a common set of real interests continues to expand.
And furthermore, given that everyone is loved by someone or another (by
God, if by no one else), we have every reason to believe that this common
set of real interests will exclude no one in the end. According to Jordan,
“to love Hitler and Bonheoffer the same is a love so indiscriminate as to be
unworthy of moral decency, let alone moral perfection” (66). But as I see it,
that makes no sense at all. Love in the sense of willing the best for another
is never indiscriminate; it is, according to the Christian faith, the very fulfillment of the moral law. Consider Saul of Tarsus, who hated Christians
every bit as much as Hitler hated the Jews. According to the self-description attributed to Saul/Paul in 1 Timothy 1:13, he was “a blasphemer, a
persecutor, and a man of violence” (in fact the foremost religious terrorist
of his day); and if his actions were less destructive than those of Hitler,
this is only because he did not have 20th Century technology or the power
of a modern state at his fingertips. So would Jordan deny that God willed
the best for Saul and also willed the best for the martyr Stephen, who was
murdered with Saul’s approval? If not, then why doubt that God wills the
best for both Hitler and Bonheoffer and thus loves both of them in exactly
the same sense?
Certainly Hitler and Bonheoffer had very different spiritual needs,
even as one’s own children might have different physical needs. So even
as loving parents might treat a “special needs child” differently than they
would a healthy athlete, God might likewise treat Hitler differently than
he would Bonheoffer. But isn’t that just what love requires? If parents were
to respond to a child’s harmful and destructive behavior in the same way
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they do to more appropriate behavior, would this be a genuine expression
of love? The question virtually answers itself. If, over an extended period
of time that includes the afterlife, God were to respond to Hitler’s behavior
in the same way that he does to Bonheoffer’s behavior, this would most
likely indicate indifference rather than perfect love.
I conclude, therefore, that Jordan’s arguments against (L) are unsuccessful. Perhaps the best hope for a cogent argument at this point would
be for Jordan to spell out a possible case where one person’s best interest
clearly comes into conflict with that of another. But for the reasons spelled
out above, I seriously doubt that there is such a possible case.8
Willamette University

8
I am ever so grateful to Tom Flint and two anonymous referees for comments that saved
me from at least one truly unfortunate confusion.

